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Abstract
advertorch is a toolbox for adversarial robustness research. It contains various implemen-
tations for attacks, defenses and robust training methods. advertorch is built on PyTorch
(Paszke et al., 2017), and leverages the advantages of the dynamic computational graph to pro-
vide concise and efficient reference implementations. The code is licensed under the LGPL
license and is open sourced at https://github.com/BorealisAI/advertorch.
1 Introduction
Machine learning models are vulnerable to “adversarial” perturbations (Szegedy et al., 2013; Biggio et al.,
2013). They are adversarial in the sense that, after these artificially constructed perturbations are
added to on the inputs of the model, human observers do not change their perception, but the pre-
dictions of a model could be manipulated. Efforts of adversarial robustness research can be roughly
divided into the following categories: generating strong and efficient attacks (Goodfellow et al., 2014;
Carlini and Wagner, 2017; Brendel et al., 2017; Xiao et al., 2018; Dong et al., 2018); detecting ad-
versarial examples (Metzen et al., 2017; Ma et al., 2018; Feinman et al., 2017); defending already
trained models (Xu et al., 2017; Guo et al., 2017); training robust models (Kurakin et al., 2016;
Madry et al., 2017; Cisse et al., 2017; Ding et al., 2018; Wong and Kolter, 2018; Mirman et al.,
2018); robustness evaluation methodologies (Weng et al., 2018; Katz et al., 2017; Athalye et al.,
2018); and understanding the vulnerability phenomena (Fawzi et al., 2017; Shafahi et al., 2019;
Ding et al., 2019).
advertorch aims to provide researchers the tools for conducting research in all the above mentioned
directions. The current version of advertorch include three of these aspects: attacks, defenses and
robust training. Compared to existing adversarial robustness related toolboxes (Papernot et al.,
2016a; Rauber et al., 2017), advertorch aims for
1. simple and consistent APIs for attacks and defenses;
2. concise reference implementations, utilizing the dynamic computational graphs in PyTorch;
and
3. fast executions with GPU-powered PyTorch implementations, which are important for “attack-
in-the-loop” algorithms, e.g. adversarial training.
In this technical report, we give an overview of the design considerations and implementations
of attacks in Section 2, defenses and robust training in Section 3, and the versioning system in
Section 4.
1
2 Attacks
advertorch implements various types of attacks, where attacks/__init__.py maintains a com-
plete list of them. We outline some of our design considerations and choices when implementing
these attacks. Specifically, we describe gradient-based attacks in Section 2.1, other attacks in Sec-
tion 2.2, and the wrapper for Backward Pass Differentiable Approximation (BPDA) (Athalye et al.,
2018) in Section 2.3.
2.1 Gradient-Based Attacks
advertorch currently implements the following gradient-based attacks:
• GradientAttack, GradientSignAttack (Goodfellow et al., 2014),
• L2BasicIterativeAttack, LinfBasicIterativeAttack (Kurakin et al., 2016),
• LinfPGDAttack, L2PGDAttack (Madry et al., 2017),
• CarliniWagnerL2Attack (Carlini and Wagner, 2017),
• LBFGSAttack (Szegedy et al., 2013),
• MomentumIterativeAttack (Dong et al., 2018),
• FastFeatureAttack (Sabour et al., 2015), and
• SpatialTransformAttack (Xiao et al., 2018).
Each of the attacks contains three core components:
• a predict function,
• a loss function loss_fn, and
• a perturb method.
Taking untargeted LinfPGDAttack on classifiers as the running example, predict is the classifier,
loss_fn is the loss function for gradient calculation, the perturb method takes x and y as its
arguments, where x is the input to be attacked, y is the true label of x. predict(x) contains the
“logits” of the neural work. The loss_fn could be the cross-entropy loss function or another suitable
loss function who takes predict(x) and y as its arguments.
However, the decoupling of these three core components is flexible enough to allow more versatile
attacks. In general, we require the predict and loss_fn to be designed such that loss_fn always
takes predict(x) and y as its inputs. As such, no knowledge about predict and loss_fn is
required by the perturb method. For example, FastFeatureAttack and LinfPGDAttack share
the same underlying perturb_iterative function, but differ in the predict and loss_fn. In
FastFeatureAttack, the predict(x) outputs the feature representation from a specific layer, the y
is the guide feature representation that we want predict(x) to match, and the loss_fn becomes
the mean squared error.
More generally, y could be any targets of the adversarial perturbation, predict(x) can output
more complex data structures, as long as the loss_fn can take them as its inputs. For example, we
might want to generate one perturbation that fools both model A’s classification result and model
B’s feature representation at the same time. In this case, we just need to make y and predict(x)
to be tuples of labels and features, and modify the loss_fn accordingly. There is no need to modify
the original perturbation implementation.
2
2.2 Other Attacks
Besides gradient-based attacks, the current version of advertorch also implements
• SinglePixelAttack, LocalSearchAttack (Narodytska and Kasiviswanathan, 2016), and
• JacobianSaliencyMapAttack (Papernot et al., 2016b).
2.3 BPDA Wrapper
The Backward Pass Differentiable Approximation (Athalye et al., 2018) is an attack technique that
enhances gradient-based attacks, when attacking defended models who have non-differentiable or
gradient-obfuscating components. Specifically, let y = f(x) be a classifier, and let xˆ = d(x) be a
preprocessing based defense module that takes the original input x and preprocesses it to be xˆ.
When d(·) is non-differentiable or gradient-obfuscating, gradient-based attacks will be ineffective on
the defended model f(d(·)), since ∇x(f(d(x))) is either unavailable or uninformative. BPDA solves
this problem by replacing the backward pass of d(·), ∂d
∂x
, with the backward pass of another function
g(·), ∂g
∂x
.
In advertorch, we implement BPDAWrapper that allows convenient backward pass replacements.
With BPDAWrapper, one can either
• specify g(·), the forward pass function that is used create the backward pass replacement, ∂g
∂x
,
or
• directly specify the backward pass replacement ∂g
∂x
.
To give a concrete example, let defense be the defense module d(x) that preprocesses the input.
defense_withbpda = BPDAWrapper(defense, forwardsub=lambda x: x) directly returns a de-
fense module with the same forward pass, but having its backward pass replaced with the backward
pass of forwardsub, which is specified as the identity function by the function lambda x: x.
This specific backward pass replacement is also known as the straight-through gradient estimator
(Bengio et al., 2013).
3 Defenses and Robust Training
Preprocessing-based Defenses: The current version implements a few preprocessing based de-
fenses 1 including
• JPEGFilter (Dziugaite et al., 2016),
• BitSqueezing, MedianSmoothing2D (Xu et al., 2017), and
• linear filters including ConvSmoothing2D, AverageSmoothing2D, and GaussianSmoothing2D.
These defenses are all implemented as PyTorch modules which can be easily combined on the fly,
thanks to the dynamic computation graph nature of PyTorch.
Robust Training: Adversarially augmented training (Kurakin et al., 2016; Madry et al., 2017;
Ding et al., 2018) and provably robust training (Wong and Kolter, 2018; Mirman et al., 2018; Gowal et al.,
2018) have been shown to be the most effective methods against worst-case perturbations. Cur-
rently, these training algorithms are not standardized yet, and usually have different variations that
1We will keep expanding this list over time.
3
are difficult to be modularized. Therefore, our plan is to provide reference implementations of rep-
resentative training algorithms in the folder advertorch_examples. The current version includes
an example, tutorial_train_mnist.py, implementing Madry et al. adversarial training on the
MNIST dataset.
4 Versioning and Reporting Benchmark Results
advertorch follows Semantic Versioning 2.0.0 (Preston-Werner, 2013), where the version number
takes the MAJOR.MINOR.PATCH format. Given such a version number, quoting from Preston-Werner
(2013), we increment the:
1. MAJOR version when we make incompatible API changes,
2. MINOR version when we add functionality in a backwards-compatible manner, and
3. PATCH version when we make backwards-compatible bug fixes.
When benchmark reporting results from advertorch, the authors should report the MAJOR.MINOR
version number and detailed hyperparameters. For example, when performing untargeted LinfPGDAttack,
the following hyperparameters shall be reported: the loss function, the maximum perturbation mag-
nitude, the number of iterations, the step size, and whether the attack is randomly initialized.
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